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Abstract
The Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma has guided re-
search on social dilemmas for decades. However, it
distinguishes between only two atomic actions: co-
operate and defect. In real-world prisoner’s dilem-
mas, these choices are temporally extended and dif-
ferent strategies may correspond to sequences of
actions, reflecting grades of cooperation. We intro-
duce a Sequential Prisoner’s Dilemma (SPD) game
to better capture the aforementioned characteris-
tics. In this work, we propose a deep multiagent
reinforcement learning approach that investigates
the evolution of mutual cooperation in SPD games.
Our approach consists of two phases. The first
phase is offline: it synthesizes policies with differ-
ent cooperation degrees and then trains a coopera-
tion degree detection network. The second phase is
online: an agent adaptively selects its policy based
on the detected degree of opponent cooperation.
The effectiveness of our approach is demonstrated
in two representative SPD 2D games: the Apple-
Pear game and the Fruit Gathering game. Experi-
mental results show that our strategy can avoid be-
ing exploited by exploitative opponents and achieve
cooperation with cooperative opponents.
1 Introduction
Learning is the key to achieving coordination with others in
multiagent environments [Stone and Veloso, 2000]. Over the
last couple of decades, a large body of multiagent learning
techniques have been proposed that aim to coordinate on var-
ious solutions (e.g., Nash equilibrium) in different settings,
e.g., minimax Q-learning [Littman, 1994], Nash Q-learning
[Hu and Wellman, 2003], and Conditional-JAL [Banerjee and
Sen, 2007], to name just a few.
One commonly investigated class of games is the Pris-
oner’s Dilemma (PD), in which an Nash equilibrium solu-
tion is not a desirable learning target. Until now, a large
body of work [Axelrod, 1984; Nowak and Sigmund, 1993;
Banerjee and Sen, 2007; Crandall and Goodrich, 2005;
Damer and Gini, 2008; Hao and Leung, 2015; Mathieu and
Delahaye, 2015] has been devoted to incentivize rational
agents towards mutual cooperation in repeated matrix PD
games. However, all the above works focus on the classic
repeated PD games, which ignores several key aspects of real
world prisoner’s dilemma scenarios. In repeated PD games,
the moves are atomic actions and can be easily labeled as co-
operative or uncooperative or learned from the payoffs [Bu-
soniu et al., 2008]. In contrast, in real world PD scenarios,
cooperation/defection behaviors are temporally extended and
the payoff signals are usually delayed (available after a num-
ber of steps of interactions).
Crandall [2012] proposes the Pepper framework for re-
peated stochastic PD games (e.g., two-player gate entering
problem), which can extend strategies originally proposed for
classic repeated matrix games. Later some techniques ex-
tend Pepper in different scenarios, e.g., stochastic games with
a large state space under tabular based framework [Elidrisi
et al., 2014] and playing against the switching opponents
[Hernandez-Leal and Kaisers, 2017]. However, these ap-
proaches rely on hand-crafted state inputs and tabular Q-
learning techniques to learn optimal policies. Thus, they can-
not be directly applied to more realistic environments whose
states are too large and complex to be analyzed beforehand.
Leibo et al. [2017] introduce a 2D Fruit Gathering game
to better capture the real world social dilemma character-
istics, while also maintaining the characteristics of classi-
cal iterated PD games. In this game, at each time step,
an agent selects its action based on its image observation
and cannot directly observe the actions of the opponent.
Different policies represent different levels of cooperative-
ness, which is a graded quantity. They investigate the co-
operation/defection emergence problem by leveraging the
power of deep reinforcement learning [Mnih et al., 2013;
Mnih et al., 2015] from the descriptive point of view: how do
multiple selfish independent agents’ behaviors evolve when
agents update their policy using deep Q-learning? In con-
trast, this paper takes a prescriptive and non-cooperative per-
spective and considers the following question: how should an
agent learn effectively in real world social dilemma environ-
ments when it is faced with different opponents?
To this end, in the paper, we first formally introduce the
general notion of sequential prisoner’s dilemma (SPD) to
model real world PD problems. We propose a multiagent
deep reinforcement learning approach for mutual cooperation
in SPD games. Our approach consists of two phases: offline
and online phases. The offline phase generates policies with
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varying cooperation degrees and trains a cooperation degree
detection network. To generate policies, we propose using
the weighted target reward and two schemes, IAC and JAC,
to train the baseline policies with varying cooperation de-
grees. Then we propose using the policy generation approach
to synthesize the full range of policies from these baseline
policies. Lastly, we propose a cooperation degree detection
network implemented as an LSTM-based structure with an
encoder-decoder module and generate a training dataset. The
online phase extends the Tit-for-Tat principle into sequential
prisoner’s dilemma scenarios. Our strategy adaptively selects
its policy with the proper cooperation degree from a contin-
uous range of candidates based on the detected cooperation
degree of an opponent. Intuitively, on one hand, our over-
all algorithm is cooperation-oriented and seeks for mutual
cooperation whenever possible; on the other hand, our algo-
rithm is also robust against selfish exploitation and resorts to
a defection strategy to avoid being exploited whenever nec-
essary. We evaluate the performance of our deep multiagent
reinforcement approach using two 2D SPD games (the Fruit
Gathering and Apple-Pear games). Our experiments show
that our agent can efficiently achieve mutual cooperation un-
der self-play and also perform well against opponents with
changing stationary policies.
2 Background
2.1 Matrix Games and the Prisoner’s Dilemma
A matrix game can be represented as a tuple
〈N, {Ai}i∈N , {Ri}i∈N 〉, where N is the set of agents,
Ai is the set of actions available to agent i with A being
the joint action space A1 × . . . × An, and Ri is the reward
function for agent i. One representative class of matrix
games is the prisoner’s dilemma game, as shown in Table
1. In this game, each agent has two actions: cooperate (C)
and defect (D), and is faced with four possible rewards: R,
P , S, and T . The four payoffs satisfy the following four
inequalities under a prisoner’s dilemma game:
• R > P : mutual cooperation is preferred to mutual de-
fection.
• R > S: mutual cooperation is preferred to being ex-
ploited by a defector.
• 2R > S+T : mutual cooperation is preferred to an equal
probability of unilateral cooperation and defection.
• T > R: exploiting a cooperator is preferred over mutual
cooperation.
• P > S: mutual defection is preferred over being ex-
ploited.
2.2 Markov Game
Markov games combine matrix games and Markov Decision
Processes and can be considered as an extension of Ma-
trix games to multiple states. A Markov game M is de-
fined by a tuple 〈N,S, {Ai}i∈N , {Ri}i∈N , T 〉, where S is
the set of states and N is the number of agents, {Ai}i∈N
is the collection of action sets, with Ai being the action
set of agent i, and {Ri}i∈N is the set of reward functions,
Table 1: Prisoner’s Dilemma
C D
C R, R S, T
D T, S P, P
Ri : S×A1×. . .×An → R is the reward function for agent i.
T is the state transition function: S×A1×. . .×An → ∆(S),
where ∆(S) denotes the set of discrete probability distribu-
tions over S. Matrix games are the special case of Markov
games when |S| = 1.
Next we formally introduce SPD by extending the classic
iterated PD game to multiple states.
2.3 Definition of Sequential Prisoner’s Dilemma
A two-player SPD is a tuple 〈M,Π〉, whereM is a 2-player
Markov game with state space S. Π is the set of poli-
cies with varying cooperation degrees. The empirical pay-
off matrix (R(s), P (s), S(s), T (s)) can be induced by poli-
cies (piC , piD ∈ Π), where piC is more cooperative than
piD. Given two policies, piC and piD, the corresponding em-
pirical payoffs (R,P, S, T ) under any starting state s with
respect to the payoff matrix in Section 2.1 can be defined
as (R(s), P (s), S(s), T (s)) through their long-term expected
payoff, where
R(s) := V pi
C ,piC
1 (s) = V
piC ,piC
2 (s), (1)
P (s) := V pi
D,piD
1 (s) = V
piD,piD
2 (s), (2)
S(s) := V pi
C ,piD
1 (s) = V
piD,piC
2 (s), (3)
T (s) := V pi
D,piC
1 (s) = V
piC ,piD
2 (s), (4)
We can define the long-term payoff V ~pii (s) for agent i when
the joint policy ~pi = (pi1, pi2) is followed starting from s.
V ~pii (s) = E~at∼~pi(st),st+1∼T (st,~at)[
∞∑
t=0
γtri(st,~at)] (5)
A Markov game is an SPD when there exists a state s ∈ S for
which the induced empirical payoff matrix satisfies the five
inequalities in Section 2.1. Since SPD is more complex than
PD, the existing approaches addressing learning in matrix PD
games cannot be directly applied in SPD.
2.4 Deep Reinforcement Learning
Q-Learning and Deep Q-Networks: Q-learning and Deep
Q-Networks (DQN) [Mnih et al., 2013; Mnih et al., 2015]
are value-based reinforcement learning approaches to learn
optimal policies in Markov environments. Q-learning makes
use of an action-value function for policy pi as Qpi(s, a) =
Es′ [r(s, a) + γEa′∼pi[Qpi(s′, a′)]]. DQN uses a deep convo-
lutional neural network to estimate Q-values and the optimal
Q-values are learned by minimizing the following loss func-
tion:
y = r + γmaxa′Q¯(s
′, a′), (6)
L(θ) = Es,a,r,s′ [(Q(s, a|θ)− y)2] (7)
where Q¯ is a target Q network whose parameters are periodi-
cally updated with the most recent θ.
Policy Gradient and Actor-Critic Algorithms: Policy
Gradient methods are for a variety of RL tasks [Williams,
1992; Sutton et al., 2000]. Their objective is to maximize
J(θ) = Es∼ppi,a∼piθ [R] by taking steps in the direction of5θJ(θ), where
5θJ(θ) = Es∼ppi,a∼piθ [5θlogpiθ(a|s)Qpi(s, a)] (8)
where ppi is the state transition distribution. Practically, the
value of Qpi can be estimated in different ways. For example,
Qpi(s, a) serves as a critic to guide the updating direction of
piθ, which leads to a class of actor-critic algorithms [Schul-
man et al., 2015; Wang et al., 2016].
3 Deep RL: Towards Mutual Cooperation
Algorithm 1 describes our deep multiagent reinforcement
learning approach, which consists of two phases, as discussed
Section 1. In the offline phase, we first seek to generate
policies with varying cooperation degrees. Since the num-
ber of policies with different cooperation degrees is infinite,
it is computationally infeasible to train all the policies from
scratch. To address this issue, we first train representative
policies using Actor-Critic until convergence (i.e., coopera-
tion and defection baseline policies) (Lines 3-5) detailed in
Section 3.1; second, we synthesize the full range of policies
(Lines 6-7) from the above baseline policies, which will be
detailed in Section 3.2. Another task is to how to effectively
detect the cooperation degree of the opponent. We divide this
task into two steps: we first train an LSTM-based cooper-
ation degree detection network offline (Lines 8-10), which
will be then used for real-time detection during the online
phase, detailed in Section 3.3. In the online phase, our agent
plays against any opponent by reciprocating with a policy of
a slightly higher cooperation degree than that of the opponent
we detect (Lines 12-18), detailed in Section 3.4. Intuitively,
on one hand, our algorithm is cooperation-oriented and seeks
for mutual cooperation whenever possible; on the other hand,
our algorithm is also robust against selfish exploitation and
resorts to defection strategy to avoid being exploited when-
ever necessary.
3.1 Train Baseline Policies with Different
Cooperation Degrees
One way of generating policies with different cooperation de-
grees is by directly changing the key parameters of the envi-
ronments. For example, Leibo et al. [Leibo et al., 2017] in-
vestigate the influence of the resource abundance degree on
the learned policy’s cooperation tendency in sequential social
dilemma games where agents compete for limited resources.
It is found that when both agents employ deep Q-learning al-
gorithms, more cooperative behaviors can be learned when
resources are plentiful and vice versa. We may leverage simi-
lar ideas of modifying game settings to generate policies with
different cooperation degrees. However, this type of approach
requires a perfect understanding of the environment as a prior,
and also may not be practically feasible when on cannot mod-
ify the underlying game engine.
Another more generalized way of generating policies with
different cooperation degrees is to modify agents’ reward sig-
nals during learning. Intuitively agents with the reward of the
Algorithm 1 The Approach of Deep Multiagent Reinforce-
ment Learning Towards Mutual Cooperation
1: //offline training
2: initialize the size Nt of training policy set, the size Ng of
generation policy set, the number Nd of training data set,
the episode number Ne and the step number Nr of each
episode
3: for training policy set index t = 1 to Nt do
4: set agents’ attitudes
5: train agents’ policy set Pt using weighted target reward
6: for generation policy set index g = 1 to Ng do
7: use policy set {Pt}t∈Nt to generate policy set Pg
8: for training data set index d = 1 to Nd do
9: generate training data setDd as {Pt}t∈Nt ∪{Pg}g∈Ng
10: use data set {Dd}d∈Nd to train cooperation degree detec-
tion network
11: //adjust the policy online
12: initialize agent′1s cooperation degree
13: for episode index e = 1 to Ne do
14: for step index r = 1 to Nr do
15: agent1 and agent2 take actions and get rewards
16: agent1 uses n-state trajectory 〈sr−n+1, . . . , sr〉 to
detect the cooperation degree cdr2 of agent2
17: agent1 updates cdr1 incrementally based on cd
r
2
18: agent1 synthesizes a policy with cdr1 using policy
generation
sum of all agents’ immediate rewards would learn towards co-
operation policies to maximize the expected accumulated so-
cial welfare eventually, and agents maximizing only their own
reward would learn more selfish (defecting) policies. For-
mally, for a two-player environment (agent i and j), agent i
computes a weighted target reward r′i as follows:
r′i = ri + attij × rj (9)
where attij ∈ [0, 1] is agent i’s attitude towards agent j,
which reflects the relative importance of agent j in agent i′s
perceived reward. By setting the values of attij and attji
to 0, agents would update their strategies in the direction of
maximizing their own accumulated discounted rewards. By
setting the values of attij and attji to 1, agents would update
their strategies in the direction of maximizing the overall ac-
cumulated discounted reward. The greater the value of agent
one’s attitude towards agent two is, the higher the cooperation
degree of agent one’s learned policy would be.
Given the modified reward signal for each agent, the next
question is how agents should learn to effectively converge to
the expected behaviors. One natural way is to resort to the
the independent Actor-Critic (IAC) or some other indepen-
dent deep reinforcement learning, i.e., equipping each agent
with an individual deep Q-learning algorithm (IDQL) with
the modified reward. However, the key element to the success
of DQL, experience replay memory, might prohibit effective
learning in deep multiagent Q-learning environments [Foer-
ster et al., 2017b; Sunehag et al., 2017]. The nonstationarity
introduced by the coexistence of multiple IACs means that
data in the replay memory may no longer reflect the current
dynamics in which the agent is learning. Thus IACs may fre-
s ŏ
ŏ s
ŏ ŏ !
AutoEncoder
Figure 1: Cooperation Degree Detection Network
quently get confused by obsolete experience and impede the
learning process. A number of methods have been proposed
to remedy this issue [Foerster et al., 2017b; Lowe et al., 2017;
Foerster et al., 2017a] and we omit the details which are out
of the scope of this paper.
Since the baseline policy training step is performed offline,
another way of improving training is to use the joint Actor-
Critic (JAC) by treating both agents as a single learner during
training. Note that we use JAC only for the purpose of train-
ing baseline policies offline, and we do not require that we can
control the policies that an opponent may use online. In JAC,
both agents share the same underlying network that learns
the optimal policy over the joint action space using a single
reward signal. In this way, the aforementioned nonstation-
arity problem can be avoided. Besides, compared with IAC,
the training efficiency can be improved significantly since the
network parameters are shared across agents in JAC.
In JAC, the weighted target reward is defined as follows:
rtotal =
∑
i∈N
atti × ri (10)
where atti ∈ [0, 1] represents the relative importance
of agent i on the overall reward. The smaller the value
of atti, the higher the cooperation degree of agent i’s
learned policy and vice versa. Given the learned joint pol-
icy pijoint(a1, a2|s, att1, att2), agent i can easily obtain its
individual policy pii as follows:
pii =
∑
aj , j 6=i
pijoint(a1, a2|s, att1, att2) (11)
As we mentioned previously, it is computationally pro-
hibitive to train a large number of policies with different co-
operation degrees due to the high training cost of deep Q-
learning, and because the policy space is infinite. To alleviate
this issue, here we propose that only two policies, coopera-
tion policy pic and defection policy pid, need to be trained.
Other policies with cooperation degree between the baselines
can be synthesized efficiently, which will be introduced in
Section 3.2.
3.2 Policy Generation
Given the baseline policies pici and pi
d
i , we synthesize multi-
ple policies. Each continuous weighting factor wc ∈ [0, 1]
s
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Figure 2: The Structure of Deep Reinforcement Learning Approach
Towards Mutual Cooperation
Figure 3: The Fruit Gathering game (left) and the Apple-Pear game.
corresponds to a new policy piwci defined as follows:
piwci = wc × pici + (1− wc)× pidi (12)
The weighting factor wc is defined as policy piwci ’s coopera-
tion degree. Specially, the linear combination of two policies
has two advantages — it 1) generates policies with varying
cooperation degrees and 2) ensures low computational cost.
Any synthesized policy piwci should be more cooperative than
pidi and more defecting than pi
c
i . The higher the value of wc
is, the more cooperative the corresponding policy piwci is. It
is important to mention that the cooperation degrees of syn-
thesized policies are ordinal, i.e., the cooperation degree of
policies only reflect their relative cooperation ranking. For
example, considering two synthesized policies pi0.6i and pi
0.3
i ,
it only implies that policy pi0.6i is more cooperative than pol-
icy pi0.3i . However, we cannot say that pi
0.6
i is twice as coop-
erative as pi0.3i . Our way of synthesizing new policies can be
understood as synthesizing policies over expert policies [He
et al., 2016]. The previous work applies a similar idea to gen-
erate policies to better respond with different opponents in
competitive environments, however, our goal here is to syn-
thesize policies with varying cooperation degrees in sequen-
tial Prisoner’s dilemmas.
3.3 Opponent Cooperation Degree Detection
In classical iterated PD games, a number of techniques have
been proposed to estimate the opponent’s cooperation degree,
e.g., counting the cooperation frequency when action can be
observed; using a partial filter or a Bayesian approach other-
wise [Damer and Gini, 2008; Hernandez-Leal et al., 2016a;
Hernandez-Leal et al., 2016b; Leibo et al., 2017]. However,
in SPD, the actions are temporally extended, and the oppo-
nent’s information (actions and rewads) cannot be observed
Figure 4: Agents’ average rewards under policies trained with dif-
ferent cooperation attitudes.
directly. Thus the previous works cannot be directly applied.
We need a way of accurately predicting the cooperation de-
gree of the opponents from the observed sequence of moves
in a qualitative manner. In SPD, given the sequential obser-
vations (time-series data), we propose an LSTM-based coop-
eration degree detection network.
In previous sections, we have introduced a way of synthe-
sizing policies of any cooperation degree, thus we can easily
prepare a large dataset of agents’ behaviors with varying co-
operation degrees. Based on this, we can transform the co-
operation degree detection problem into a supervised learn-
ing problem: given a sequence of moves of an opponent, our
task is to detect the cooperation degree (label) of this oppo-
nent. We propose a recurrent neural network, which com-
bines an autoencoder and a recurrent classifier, as shown in
Figure 1. Combing an autoencoder with a recurrent classi-
fier brings two major benefits here. First, the classifier and
autoencoder share underlying layer parameters of the neural
network. This ensures that the classification task is based on
the effective feature extraction of the observed moves, which
improves the classification detection accuracy. Second, con-
current training of the autoencoder also helps to accelerate the
training speed of the classifier and reduces fluctuation during
training.
The network is trained on experiences collected by agents.
Both agents i and j interact with the environment starting
with initialized policies pii and pij , yielding a training set D:
D = {(X, label)|X = env(pii, pij),
pii ∈ {pici , pidi }, pij ∈ Πj ,
if pii = pici , label = 1 else 0}i∈N
(13)
where pici and pi
d
i are baseline policies for agent i. Πj is
the learned policy set of its opponent j. label is the rela-
tive cooperation degree of policy pii, and X is the set of tra-
jectories under the joint policy (pii, pij). For each trajectory
x = 〈s1, s2, . . . , sd〉 ∈ X , its label is the cooperation degree
of agent i’s policy. The network is trained to minimize the
following weighted cross entropy loss function as follows:
L(fc(~x), label) = −(w1 × label1 × log(p1)+
w2 × (1− lable1)× log(1− p1)) (14)
where w1 is the weight of label1. p1 is the network output,
which is the probability of pic.
3.4 Play Against Different Opponents
Once we have detected the cooperation degree of the oppo-
nent, the final question arises as to how an agent should se-
lect proper policies to play against that opponent. A self-
interested approach would be to simply play the best response
policy toward the detected policy of the opponent. However,
as we mentioned before, we seek a solution that can allow
agents to achieve cooperation while avoiding being exploited.
Figure 2 shows our overall approach playing with oppo-
nents towards mutual cooperation. At each time step t, agent
i uses its previous n-step sequence of observations (from time
step t− n to t) as the input of the detection network, and ob-
tain the detected cooperation degree cdtj . However, the one-
shot detection of the opponent’s cooperation degree might be
misleading due to either the detection error of our classifier or
the stochastic behaviors of the opponent. Thus this may lead
to high variance of our detection outcome and our response
policy thereafter. To reduce the variance, agent i uses the ex-
ponential smoothing to update its current cooperation degree
estimation of its opponent j as follows:
cdti = (1− α)× cdt−1i + α× cdtj (15)
where cdt−1i is agent i’s cooperation degree in the last time
step, and α is the cooperation degree changeing factor.
Finally, agent i sets its own cooperation degree equal to cdti
plus its reciprocation level, and then synthesizes a new policy
with the updated cooperation degree following Equation (12)
as its next-step strategy to play against its opponent. Note
that the reciprocation level can be quite low and still produce
cooperation. The benefit is that it will not lead to a significant
loss if the opponent is not cooperative at all, while full co-
operation can be reached if the opponent reciprocates in the
same way. Also, note that here we only provide a way of re-
sponding to the opponent with changing policies. However,
our overall approach is general and any existing multiagent
strategy selection approaches can be applied here.
4 Simulation and Results
4.1 SPD Game Descriptions
In this section, we adopt the Fruit Gathering game [Leibo et
al., 2017] to evaluate the effectiveness of our approach. We
also propose another game Apple-Pear, which also satisfies
real world social dilemma conditions we mentioned before.
Each game involves two agents (in blue and red). The task
of an agent in the Fruit Gathering game is to collect as many
apples, represented by green pixels, as possible (see Figure 3
(left)). An agent’s action set is: step forward, step backward,
step left, step right, rotate left, rotate right, use beam, and
stand still. The agent obtains the corresponding fruit when
it steps on the same square as the fruit is located. When an
agent collects an apple, it will receive a reward 1. And the ap-
ple will be removed from the environment and respawn after
40 frames. Each agent can also emit a beam in a straight line
along its current orientation. An agent is removed from the
map for 20 frames if it is hit by the beam twice. Intuitively,
a defecting policy in this game is one which frequently tags
the rival agent to remove it from the game. A cooperation
(a) The Apple-Pear game
(b) The Fruit Gathering game
Figure 5: Average and total rewards under different cooperation degrees. The cooperation degrees of agent1 and agent2 increase from left
to right and from bottom to top respectively. Each cell corresponds the rewards of different policy pairs.
policy is one that rarely tags the other agent. For the Apple-
Pear game, there is a red apple and a green pear (see Figure 3
(right)). The blue agent prefers apple while the red agent
prefers pear. Each agent has four actions: step right, step left,
step backward, step forward, and each step of moving incurs a
cost of 0.01. The fruit is collected when the agent steps on the
same square as it. When the blue (red) agent collects an apple
(pear) individually, it receives a higher reward 1. When the
blue agent collects a pear individually, it receives a lower re-
ward 0.5. The situation is the opposite for the red agent. One
exception is that they both receive a half of their correspond-
ing rewards when they share a pear or an apple. In this game,
a fully defecting policy is to collect both fruits whenever the
fruit-collecting reward exceeds the moving cost, while a co-
operative one is to only collect the fruit it prefers to maximize
the social welfare of agents. In Section 4.4, we find that the
two games satisfy the definition of SPD games in Section 2.3
by using policies with different cooperation degrees to play
with each other.
4.2 Network Architecture and Parameter Settings
In both games, our network architectures for training the
baseline policies follow standard AC networks, except that
we allow both actor and critic to share the same underlying
network to reduce the parameter space. For the underlying
network, the first hidden layer convolves 32 filters of 8 × 8
with stride 4 with the input image and applies a rectifier non-
linearity. The second hidden layer convolves 64 filters of 4×4
with stride 2, again followed by a rectifier nonlinearity. This
is followed by a third convolutional layer that convolves 64
filters of 3 × 3 with stride 1 followed by a rectifier. For the
actor, on the basis of sharing network, the next layer includes
128 units with rectifier nonlinearity, and the final softmax
layer has as many units as the number of actions. The critic
is similar to the actor, but with only one scalar output.
The recurrent cooperation degree detection network is
shown in Figure 1. The autoencoder and the detection net-
work share the same underlying network. The first hidden
layer convolves 10 filters of 3× 3 with stride 2 with the input
image and applies a rectifier nonlinearity. The second hidden
layer is the same as the first one and the third hidden layer
convolves 10 filters of 3 × 3 with stride 3 and applies a rec-
tifier nonlinearity. The autoencoder is followed by a fourth
hidden layer that deconvolves 10 filters of 3× 3 with stride 3
and applies a sigmoid and its output shape is 21 × 21 × 10.
The next layer deconvolves 10 filters of 3×3 with stride 2 and
applies a sigmoid and the output shape is 42× 42× 10. The
final layer deconvolves 10 filters of 3 × 3 with stride 2 and
applies a sigmoid and the output shape is 84× 84× 3. Coop-
eration degree detection network is followed by two LSTM
layers of 256 units. The final layer is an output node.1
For the Apple-Pear game, each episode has at most 100
steps. The exploration rate is annealed linearly from 1 to 0.1
over the first 20000 steps. The weight parameters are updated
by soft target updates [Lillicrap et al., 2015] every 4 steps to
avoid the update fluctuation as follows:
θ′ ← 0.05θ + 0.95θ′ (16)
where θ is the parameter of the policy network and θ′ is the
1The code and network architectures will be available soon:
https://goo.gl/3VnFHj.
parameter of the target network. The learning rate is set to
0.0001 and memory is set to 25000. The batch size is 128.
For the loss function in the cooperation degree detection net-
work, we set w1 and w2 as 1 and 2 (see Equation 14). When
agents play with different opponents online, we assign the
number of states visited to the length n of the state sequence
which is the input of cooperation detection network. The co-
operation degree changing factor α is set to 1.
The Fruit Gathering game uses the same detection net-
work architecture. The actor-critic uses independent policy
networks. Each episode has at most 100 steps during train-
ing. The exploration rate and the memory are the same as
the Apple-Pear game. The weight parameters are updates the
same as the Apple-Pear game:
θ′ ← 0.001θ + 0.999θ′ (17)
When agents play with different opponents online, we set
state sequence length n as 50 and the changing factor α is
set to 0.02.
4.3 Effect of Baseline Policy Generation
For the Apple-Pear game, the baseline policies are trained us-
ing the JAC scheme. The individual rewards of each agent in-
crease gradually as its attitude increases and the other agent’s
attitude decreases. The results also indicate that an agent
can learn a defecting policy when its attitude that represents
its relative importance on overall reward increases and vice
versa. We set the attitude in Equation (10) between 0.1 and
0.9 to train baseline policies. The reason that attitudes are
not set 0 and 1 is that these settings will cause an agent with
meaningless policy, e.g, the agent whose attitude equals 0
makes no influence to total reward in Equation (10) and hence
will always avoid collecting fruit. This would, in turn, af-
fect the learned policy quality of the other agent (i.e., lazy
agent problem [Perolat et al., 2017]). Figure 4 shows the av-
erage rewards of agents under policies trained with different
weighted target rewards. We also evaluate the IAC scheme
and similar results can be obtained and we omit it here.
For the Fruit Gathering game, the learning policies are syn-
thesized based on IAC. IAC is more efficient for training
baseline policies in this game, relative to JAC, since the re-
wards of collecting the apple for both agents are the same.
On the other hand, if we adopt a JAC approach, it might lead
to the consequence that the agent with a higher weight will
collect all the apples, while the other agent will not collect
any apples. Similar results as the Apple-Pear game can be
observed here and we omit it here.
4.4 Effect of Policy Generation
For the Apple-Pear game, the baseline cooperation policies
pic1 and pi
c
2 are trained under the setting of {att1 = att2 =
0.5}. For agent1, the baseline defection policy pid1 has{att1 = 0.75, att2 = 0.25}. For agent2, the baseline de-
fection policy pid2 has {att1 = 0.25, att2 = 0.75}. Then we
generate the policy set of agent1 Π1 = {pi = w1×pic1 + (1−
w1)×pid1 |w1 = 0.0, 0.1, . . . , 1.0} and the policy set of agent2
Π2 = {pi = w2×pic2+(1−w2)×pid2 |w2 = 0.0, 0.1, . . . , 1.0}.
After that, two policies pi1 and pi2 are sampled from Π1 and
Π2 and matched against each other in the games for 200,000
episodes. The average rewards are assigned to individual cells
of different attitude pairs, in which pi1 correspond to policies
with varying cooperation degreesw1 for agent 1, and pi2, poli-
cies with varying cooperation degreesw2 for agent 2 (see Fig-
ure 5 (a)). In Figure 5 (a), we can observe that when agents’
cooperation degrees decrease, their rewards decrease. When
both of their cooperation degrees increase, which means they
are more cooperative, the sum of their rewards increase. Be-
sides, given a fixed cooperation degree of agent1, agent2’s
reward is increased as its cooperation degree decreases, and
vice versa. Similar pattern can be observed for agent 1 as
well. Therefore, it indicates that we can successfully synthe-
size policies with a continuous range of cooperation degrees.
It also confirms that the Apple-Pear game can be seen as an
SPD following the definition in Section 2.3.
For the Fruit Gathering game, we use policies with both
attitudes equal to 0 and 0.5 as the baseline defection and co-
operation policy respectively. Figure 5 (b) shows the results
of their rewards, which is similar to the Apple-Pear game.
4.5 Effect of Cooperation Degree Detection
This section evaluates the detection power of the cooperation
degree detection network. First, we train the cooperation de-
gree detection network using datasets which include only the
data labeled as full cooperation or full defection. The train-
ing data (〈s0, s1, s2, . . . , sn〉, label) in the simulation is ob-
tained based on baseline policies of agent2. We set its label
as 1 when agent2 uses its baseline cooperation policy and
0 when agent2 uses its baseline defection policy. Then we
use this dataset to train the detection network. After training
we evaluate the detection accuracy by applying it to detect-
ing the cooperation degree of agent 2 when it uses policies
with cooperation degrees from 0 to 1 and the degree interval
is 0.1. The policy pair (pi1, pi2) is sampled from Π1 and Π2
and matched against with each other for each episode. After
the cooperation degree average value is stable, we view the
output value as the cooperation degree of agent2.
For the Apple-Pear game, we collect 10000 data for state
sequence lengths {3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8}. The cooperation detec-
tion results of agent2 are shown in Figure 6 (a). We can
see that the cooperation detection values can well approxi-
mate the true values with slight variance. Besides, the net-
work can clearly detect the order of different cooperation de-
grees, which allows us to calculate the cooperation degree of
agent2 accurately. For the Fruit Gathering game, we collect
4000 data for each state sequence lengths {40, 50, 60, 70},
which includes 2000 data labeled as 1 and 2000 data labeled
as 0. The network is trained in a similar way and the coop-
eration degree detection accuracy is high (see Figure 6 (b)).
From Figure 6, We observe that the detection results are al-
most linear with the true values. Fig 6(c) shows the detection
results of agent2 when agent1’s policy is fixed with cooper-
ation degree 1. We can see that the true cooperation degree
of agent2 can be easily obtained by fitting a linear curve be-
tween the predicted and true values. Thus for each policy
of agent1 in Π1, we can fit a linear function to evaluate the
true cooperation degrees of agent2. During practical online
learning, when agent1 uses policies of varying cooperation
degrees to play with agent2, it firstly chooses the function
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Figure 6: The detection results for agent2 under different cooperation degrees of agent1: (a) Apple-Pear game; (b) Fruit Gathering game;
(c)agent1’s cooperation degree as 1 in Fruit Gathering game
whose corresponding policy is closest to the used policy, and
then computes the cooperation degree of agent2.
Figure 7: Performance under self-play in the Apple-Pear game when
both agents use our strategy.
0 20000 40000 60000 80000 100000
step
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
ag
en
t′ 1
sc
oo
pe
ra
tio
n
de
gr
ee
0 20000 40000 60000 80000 100000
step
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
ag
en
t′ 2
sc
oo
pe
ra
tio
n
de
gr
ee
Figure 8: Performance under self-play in the Fruit Gathering game
when both agents use our strategy.
4.6 Performance under Self-Play
Next, we evaluate the learning performance of our approach
under self-play. Since the initialized policies of agents can af-
fect their behaviors in the game, we evaluate under all differ-
ent initial conditions: a) agent1 starts with cooperation pol-
icy and agent2 starts with defecting policy; b) agent1 starts
with defecting policy and agent2 starts with cooperation pol-
icy; c) both agents start with cooperation policies; d) both
agents start with defecting policies. Agents converge to full
cooperation for all four cases. We present the results for the
last case, which is the most challenging one (see Figure 7 and
Figure 8). When both agents start with a defection policy, it
is more likely for them to model each other as defective and
thus both play defect thereafter. Our approach enables agents
to successfully detect the cooperation tendency of their op-
ponents from sequential actions and converge to cooperation
at last. In the Apple-Pear game, agents converge efficiently
within few episodes. The reason is that when agents are close
to fruits they prefer, they will collect fruits no matter whether
their policies are cooperative or not. Thus, an agent is more
likely to be detected as being cooperative, which induces its
opponent to change policies towards cooperation. In contrast,
for the Fruit Gathering game, agents need a relatively longer
time before converging to full cooperation. This is because
in the Fruit Gathering game, the main feature of detecting the
cooperation degree is beam emitting frequency. When one
agent emits a beam continuously, they change to defect. Only
when both agents collect fruits without emitting beam would
lead to mutual cooperation.
4.7 Playing with Opponents with Changing
Strategies
Now, we evaluate the performance against switching oppo-
nents, during a repeated interaction of T episodes, the op-
ponent changes its policy after a certain number of episodes
and the learning agent does not know when the switches hap-
pen. Through this, we can evaluate the cooperation degree
detection performance of our network, and verify whether our
strategy can perform better than the fully cooperation or de-
fection strategy from two aspects: 1) our approach seeks for
mutual cooperation whenever possible; 2) our approach is ro-
bust against selfish exploitation. In the Apple-Pear game, we
vary the value ofNchange in the range of [50, 200] at the inter-
val of 30, and similarly in the Fruit Gathering game we vary it
in the range of [100, 500] at the interval of 100. Only one set
of results for each game are provided in Figure 9 and 10. The
results of other values of Nchange are in the Appendix. Simi-
lar phenomenon can be observed for other values ofNchange.
From Figure 9 and 10, we observe that for both games, the
average rewards of the learning agent (agent1) are higher
than its rewards using cooperation strategy pic. And the so-
cial welfare (the sum of both agents’ rewards) is higher than
that using defection strategy pid. This indicates that our ap-
proach can prevent agents from being exploited by defecting
opponents and seek for cooperation against cooperative ones.
By comparing the results for different values of Nchange, we
Figure 9: Apple-Pear game: agent2’s policy varies between pic and pid every 110 episodes. The average rewards of the agent1 are higher
when using our approach than using pic, which means our approach can avoid being exploited by defective opponents. The social welfare is
higher than using pid, indicating that our approach can seek for cooperation against cooperative ones.
Figure 10: Fruit Gathering game: agent2’s policy varies between pic and pid every 300 steps. Similar phenomenon can be observed as in
Figure 16.
find that the detection accuracy decreases when the opponent
changes its policy quickly. Since the agent requires observ-
ing several episodes to detect the cooperation degree of the
opponent, when the agent realizes its opponent changes the
policy and adjusts its policy, the opponent may change the
policy again. This problem becomes less severe when T is
comparatively large.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we make the first step in investigating multia-
gent learning problem in large-scale PD games by leverag-
ing the recent advance of deep reinforcement learning. A
deep multiagent RL approach is proposed towards mutual
cooperation in SPD games to support adaptive end-to-end
learning. Empirical simulation shows that our agent can
efficiently achieve mutual cooperation under self-play and
also perform well against opponents with changing strate-
gies. As the first step towards solving multiagent learning
problem in large-scale environments, we believe there are
many interesting questions remaining for future work. One
worthwhile direction is how to generalize our approach to
other classes of large-scale multiagent games. Generalized
policy detection and reuse techniques should be proposed,
e.g., by extending existing approaches in traditional rein-
forcement learning contexts [Hernandez-Leal et al., 2016b;
Hernandez-Leal et al., 2016a; Hernandez-Leal and Kaisers,
2017].
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A Playing with Opponents with Changing Strategies
A.1 The Apple-Pear Game
Figure 11: Apple-Pear game: agent2’s policy varies between pic and pid every 50 episodes.
Figure 12: Apple-Pear game: agent2’s policy varies between pic and pid every 80 episodes.
Figure 13: Apple-Pear game: agent2’s policy varies between pic and pid every 110 episodes.
Figure 14: Apple-Pear game: agent2’s policy varies between pic and pid every 140 episodes.
Figure 15: Apple-Pear game: agent2’s policy varies between pic and pid every 170 episodes.
Figure 16: Apple-Pear game: agent2’s policy varies between pic and pid every 200 episodes.
A.2 The Gathering Game
Figure 17: Fruit Gathering game: agent2’s policy varies between pic and pid every 100 steps.
Figure 18: Fruit Gathering game: agent2’s policy varies between pic and pid every 200 steps.
Figure 19: Fruit Gathering game: agent2’s policy varies between pic and pid every 300 steps.
Figure 20: Fruit Gathering game: agent2’s policy varies between pic and pid every 400 steps.
Figure 21: Fruit Gathering game: agent2’s policy varies between pic and pid every 500 steps.
